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**1981/06/19**

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EXCISE

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL  
\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

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FILM= D810288-0186

DATE= 19 JUN 81

TYPE= TE

FROM= STATE

DRAFTER= JJBUCZACKI

OFFICE= ORIGIN EA

TO= BONN  
ISLAMABAD  
LONDON  
MULTIPLE

CHANNEL= n/a

ORIGHAND= n/a

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ORIGCLASS= CONFIDENTIAL

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EO= GS 19870619 SEITZ, R G H

SUBJECT= TALKING POINTS FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS ON CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

REFERENCE= n/a

CONTROL\_NBR= n/a

ENCLOSURE= n/a

LOCATOR= TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

ERRORS= 1

CONCEPTS= FOREIGN RELATIONS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, BRIEFING MATERIALS, FOREIGN  
MINISTERS MEETINGS, MINISTERIAL MEETINGS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE		IS/FPC/CDR	Date: 12/6/92
<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations	
<input type="checkbox"/> IN PART			
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to:	
Exemptions: 31		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONF	
Exemptions:		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or	

TAGS= OVIP, CH, US, ASEAN, ANZUS, (HAIG, ALEXANDER M JR)

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DRAFTED BY EA/C:JJBUCZACKI  
APPROVED BY EA/C:SSHALLFORD  
EA:DCOLEMAN  
SS-O:JTAYLOR

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O 190710Z JUN 81  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE  
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INFO AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI 0000

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

FOLLOWING REPEAT SECTO 4103 DTG 171717Z JUN 81 ACTION SECSTATE  
BANGKOK BEIJING CANBERRA JAKARTA KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE  
TOKYO WELLINGTON USNATO INFO HONG KONG MOSCOW VIENTIANNE QUOTE:

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SECTO

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/17/87 (R. G. H. SEITZ)  
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER) CH, US  
SUBJ: TALKING POINTS FOR BACKGROUND BRIEFINGS ON  
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- SECRETARY'S VISIT TO CHINA

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WILL BE USED BY SECRETARY HAIG FOR BRIEFINGS TO ATTENDEES AT ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING AND ANZUS COUNCIL ON THE RESULTS OF HIS TRIP TO CHINA. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE AUTHORIZED TO DRAW ON THESE REMARKS TO BRIEF HOST COUNTRY AND FRIENDLY THIRD COUNTRY DIPLOMATS WHO INQUIRE ABOUT ACTIVITIES ON THE CHINA TRIP. MEETINGS WITH CHINESE LEADERS INCLUDED VICE CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING, PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG, VICE PREMIERS GENG PAO AND BO YIBO, AND FOREIGN MINISTER HUANG HUA.

3. CHINA: GENERAL

— THE PURPOSE OF THIS VISIT WAS TO GIVE MOMENTUM TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE PRC AND TO DISPEL SOME MISAPPREHENSIONS WHILE PROVIDING EACH OTHER WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THE WORLD SITUATION.

— AS I INDICATED IN MY REMARKS TO THE PRESS AND IN MY TOASTS IN BEIJING, OUR MEETINGS WERE UNUSUALLY FRUITFUL AND PRODUCTIVE AND THERE WAS A BROAD RANGE OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN CHINESE AND AMERICAN VIEWS ON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WORLDWIDE. THIS DOES NOT MEAN, HOWEVER, A CONCURRENCE OF APPROACH OR MEANS TO SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS.

— WE DISCUSSED THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO BUILDING U.S. STRENGTH AND PREPAREDNESS AND TO EXERCISE LEADER-CONFIDENTIAL

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SHIP IN COORDINATION WITH OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

— WE SPOKE OF THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THE SOVIET THREAT AND ITS APPLICATION, SOMETIMES THROUGH PROXIES, IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD. WE REVIEWED SPECIFIC POLICIES AND PRACTICES WHICH WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD. WE AGREED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS A GLOBAL STRATEGY AND THAT A TRULY GLOBAL RESPONSE, DRAWING ON THE DIFFERENT CAPACITIES OF VARIOUS NATIONS, WAS NECESSARY TO COUNTER IT.

— WE ALSO AGREED THAT UNLIKE THE SOVIET UNION, THE

U.S. AND CHINA RESPECT THE SOVEREIGNTY OF BIG AND SMALL NATIONS ALIKE AND THUS SUPPORT THE GOAL OF THOSE NATIONS THAT HAVE CHOSEN THE PATH OF GENUINE NONALIGNMENT.

CHINA: BILATERAL RELATIONS

--WE STRESSED THE CONTINUITY OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA, FROM THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE TO THE PRESENT, AND THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO EXPAND AND STRENGTHEN OUR STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRC.

--ON TAIWAN, I TOLD THE CHINESE THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO MANAGE OUR UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE OF TAIWAN AS WE HAVE SINCE NORMALIZATION, THAT IS, BASED FIRMLY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON NORMALIZATION.

(FOR ANZUS ONLY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE STATED THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT, THE LAW OF THE LAND FOR US, WOULD BE DONE IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE. I BELIEVE THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THIS. SIMILARLY, WE LISTENED TO THEIR VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN AND MADE OUR OWN VIEWS CLEAR TO THEM. CONFIDENTIAL

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WE UNDERSTAND THEIR SENSITIVITIES AND THEY NOW UNDERSTAND OURS.)

--WE TOOK A NUMBER OF BILATERAL INITIATIVES WHICH WILL IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO DEAL MORE EQUITABLY WITH THE CHINESE INCLUDING OUR INTENTION, UNDER U.S. EXPORT REGULATIONS, TO TREAT THEM AS A FRIENDLY, NON-ALLIED NATION.

--IN THIS CONTEXT, I INDICATED THAT WE ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER CHINESE REQUESTS FOR WEAPONRY ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, THOUGH WE WILL NOT MAKE ANY SPECIFIC DECISIONS UNTIL WE HAVE CONSULTED FULLY WITH CONGRESS AND WITH YOU AND OUR OTHER FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

--THE NEXT STEP IN THIS PROCESS WILL BE THE VISIT OF PLA VICE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF LIU HUAQING IN AUGUST.

--I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT EVERYTHING THAT UNFOLDS IN THIS AREA WILL BE EVOLUTIONARY, CONTROLLED AND REFLECTIVE OF THIRD COUNTRY INTERESTS.

--WE FRANKLY EXPECT THAT THE CHINESSE REQUEST WILL BE

MODEST AND WE HAVE NO FIRM IDEA OF WHAT THEY MIGHT WISH TO ACQUIRE; IT IS LIKELY, GIVEN THEIR ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS, THEY WILL CONCENTRATE ON TECHNOLOGY RATHER THAN WEAPONS.

-I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ARMING CHINA AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHERS AND WILL KEEP IN TOUCH AS THIS RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPS.

CHINA: KAMPUCHEA

-MANY OF MY MEETINGS AND THE SEPARATE MEETINGS OF MY  
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COLLEAGUES INVOLVED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF KAMPUCHEA AND OUR TWO SIDES' VIEWS ON HOW TO MAKE THE MOST OUT OF EFFORTS TO BRING PRESSURES TO BEAR ON VIETNAM TO END ITS OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA.

-WE DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR A COALITION AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF GETTING THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION PARTIES TOGETHER. THE CHINESE ARGUED THAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD DIMINISH DK MORALE BY CALLING NOW FOR THEIR DISARMAMENT IN A POST-WAR SITUATION BUT ARGUED INSTEAD THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD GET TOGETHER TO COOPERATE. THERE APPEARED TO BE ROOM, HOWEVER, FOR CHINESE MOVEMENT ON THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE LATER ON.

-THE CHINESE URGED THAT THERE BE GREATER MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE EFFORTS IN ADDITION TO THEIR OWN. BUT WE INDICATED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE U.S. TO CONSIDER THIS TYPE OF ASSISTANCE NOW. WE STATED, AS WE HAVE DONE BEFORE, THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE - FOOD AND MEDICINES TO THE BORDER AREAS - AND MORAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. ANY OTHER TYPE OF ASSISTANCE COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED ONCE IT BECAME CLEAR THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME GREATER COHESION TO THE RESISTANCE FORCES AND SOME ASSURANCE THAT THE U.S. AID WAS NOT JUST GOING TO POL POT.

-IN DISCUSSION OF THE CONFERENCE AND ITS STRATEGY, CHINESE LEADERS INDICATED THEY BELIEVED THAT THE UNGA RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD BE THE BASIS OF A SOLUTION. THEY STATED THEY HAD CONVEYED THESE VIEWS TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM WHO HAD JUST VISITED BEIJING.

-THE CHINESE DECLARED THEY WERE NOT SEEKING SPHERES OF

INFLUENCE IN THE REGION OR ALONG THEIR BORDERS AND THEY BELIEVE, AS THE UNGA RESOLUTION INDICATED, THAT THE FATE OF  
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KAMPUCHEA SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THE KHMER PEOPLE THEMSELVES.

--WE INDICATED THAT WE WERE ALSO GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THEIR POSITION ON THE CONFERENCE BUT THAT CLEARLY ASEAN'S VIEWS AND THE RESULTS OF YOUR MEETING WOULD BE OF GREAT INTEREST TO US, E.G., THE QUESTION OF POST-HOSTILITIES DISARMAMENT.

--AS I HAVE TOLD SOME OF YOU BEFORE, THE U.S. ALSO INTENDS TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE SEATING OF THE DK IN THE UNGA THIS YEAR THOUGH CLEARLY WE AND OTHERS WOULD FEEL MORE

COMFORTABLE IN DOING SO IF THERE WERE SOME SIGNS THAT OTHER NON-DK GROUPS WERE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GOVERNMENT.

--I URGED THE CHINESE LEADERS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR RELATIONS WITH ASEAN TO ELIMINATE ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN YOU AND BEIJING, PARTICULARLY ASKING THAT THEY DIMINISH THEIR RESIDUAL SUPPORT FOR INSURGENT GROUPS AS A MEANS OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE.

--I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM EACH OF YOU THE IMPRESSIONS  
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YOU HAVE GATHERED AND THE POSITIONS YOU HAVE ADOPTED DURING THE COURSE OF YOUR FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING. HAIG  
UNQUOTE  
STOESSEL

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\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* CONFIDENTIAL